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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Dismissal without 20 Days 
Notice of the Reasons Therefore. 
Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief requires either sufficient notice 
from the state or a 20 day notice from the court. I.C. § l 9-4906(b) and ( c ); Saykhamchone v. 
State, 127 Idaho 319,900 P.2d 795 (1995); Anderson v. State,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _, 
2007 WL 322794 (Ct. App. 2007), rev. granted, March 21, 2008. See also Respondent's Brief 
at page 12. In this case, as set out in Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 15-19, summary 
dismissal was not appropriate, because the required notice was not provided. 
In particular, the state's first answer to Gerry's petition included only a blanket denial of 
all of his allegations, a denial that there were any material facts not previously heard, and a denial 
that Gerry received ineffective assistance of counsel. Its motion only argued that Gerry had filed 
no affidavit, record, or other evidence supporting his allegations, an argument that was false as 
the record contains the 249 page affidavit Gerry filed in support of his petition. In its amended 
answer, the state incorporated its initial answer and then denied all allegations other than those in 
paragraphs 1-9 and 11 of the amended petition. In its amended motion for summary judgment, 
the state, ignoring Gerry's prose petition which was incorporated into the amended petition, 
asserted that claims of an unconstitutional judgment or sentence or prosecutorial misconduct 
cannot be raised in post-conviction because they were or could have been raised in direct appeal 
and that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be dismissed because it was not 
supported by an affidavit, record, or other evidence. The state's lack of proper notice was made 
glaringly obvious in the prosecutor's comments to the court on the motion for summary 
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dismissal; the prosecutor stated that he had not ascertained what issues were raised in the prose 
petition. See Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 17-19. 
Gerry argues on appeal that the lack of notice from the state made summary dismissal of 
his petition improper. Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 15-19. He also argues that DeRushe v. 
State, 146 Idaho 599,200 P.3d 1149 (2009), holds that if the state has offered grounds for its 
motion, but has not stated those grounds with particularity, the petitioner, if represented by 
counsel, must raise any objection in the district court, prior to raising the issue on appeal. But, 
the case also holds that a district court errs in dismissing a petition without giving the required 
twenty-day notice when it acts on its own motion, or on grounds not offered by the state, or when 
the state has only alleged a failure to comply with the post-conviction statute. Further, it holds 
that all these issues may be raised for the first time on appeal. Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 
page 2. 
The state bas not disagreed with this analysis of DeRushe. See Respondent's Brief at 
pages 11-13. 
And, in fact, the only appellate case applying DeRushe reaches this same conclusion. 
Kelly v. State, _Idaho_,_ P.3d _ 2009 WL 973499 (Ct. App. 2009), states: 
[W)e do not read DeRushe to completely eliminate the long-standing notice 
requirement for summarily dismissing a post-conviction application. Rather, 
DeRushe held only that, upon receiving notice from the state or the court, an 
applicant cannot challenge the sufficiency of the notice for the first time on appeal. 
DeRushe does not preclude an applicant from asserting for the first time on appeal 
that the district court improperly summarily dismissed a claim without providing 
any notice either through the state's motion or the court's own notice. h1 addition, 
DeRushe does not hold that, if the state files a motion for summary dismissal but 
the district court dismisses a claim on a ground not contained in the state's motion 
without providing additional notice, an applicant is precluded from challenging 
that dismissal for the first time on appeal. 
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[W]e do not read DeRushe as eliminating the requirement that the state's motion 
identify the deficiency with each post-conviction claim. See e.g., Garza v. State, 
139 Idaho 533, 537-38, 82 P.3d 445, 449-50 (2003) (enumerating several of 
Garza's claims and noting that, because the "district court did not give the 
rationale for dismissing the claims," the notice of intent to dismiss was 
insufficient; Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 669, 152 P.3d 25, 30 (Ct. App. 
2006) (holding that "the broad and generic contentions in the state's motion do 
not refer to Franck-Teel's specific allegations and, thus, cannot be construed as 
addressing the perceived flaws in any particular item of evidence or legal analysis, 
which Franck-Teel needed to address in order to avoid summary dismissal"); 
Flores [v. State], 128 Idaho [476,) 478,915 P.2d [38,) 40 [(Ct. App. 1996)) 
(holding that, "written in such general terms, the state's motion did not address 
the insufficiency ofFores's particular claims and failed to give Flores notice of 
any issues or arguments to which he needed to respond"); Martinez [v. State], 126 
Idaho [813,) 818, 892 P.2d [488,) 493 [(Ct. App. 1995)] (holding that the state's 
motion "identified no particular basis for dismissal of Martinez's various claims, 
and was therefore ineffective to give him any notice of any deficiencies in his 
evidence or any legal analysis he needed to address in order to avoid summary 
dismissal of his action"). 
As the Supreme Court elaborated, a "notice of intent to dismiss must state the 
reasons for dismissal in order to provide an applicant with meaningful opportunity 
to provide further legal authority or evidence that may demonstrate the existence 
of a genuine factual issue." Garza, 139 Idaho at 537, 82 P.3d at 449. Providing 
an individualized response to a post-conviction applicant's allegations is 
necessary to ensure that an applicant can respond with additional authority or 
evidence if it exists and so that the applicant "cannot assert surprise or prejudice" 
regarding the basis of dismissal. DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 601,200 P.3d at 1150. 
2009 WL 973499.*4, 7 (italics original). 
Gerry argued in his Opening Brief and Supplemental Brief that the state's motions for 
summary dismissal did not address the issues Gerry raised in his prose petition. Given this lack 
of notice, the order summarily dismissing his petition must be reversed. DeRushe, supra. 
Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 15-19; Appellant's Supplemental Brief pages 1-3. 
In response, the state has argued that Gerry is actually arguing that the notice was vague, 
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not absent, and therefore, summary dismissal was allowed. Respondent's Brief at page 13. The 
state does not argue that Gerry has not set out the proper analysis of DeRushe and that if the 
notice was lacking, the issue may be raised for the first time on appeal and summary dismissal 
was not appropriate. 
Thns, the question is one of the record. And, the record is clear. The state's answers and 
motions did not even identify the 29 issues raised by Gerry, let alone identify the deficiency with 
each issue. Garza v. State, supra, as cited in Kelly, supra. In no way did the state's answers and 
motions provide "an individualized response" to Gerry's allegations so as to "ensure that he 
[ could) respond with additional authority or evidence." Kelly, supra. 
If ever there was a case wherein there was not sufficient notice given of the grounds for 
summary dismissal, this is it. Summary dismissal is not appropriate when the prosecutor admits 
that he does not actually know what issues the petitioner has raised and the court states that it 
was hoping that someone would have clarified the situation so that the issues being raised would 
be "legible and easy to grasp." Tr. 5/29/07 p. 3, 5; Tr. 1/9/07 p. 16-17. 
For the reasons set out in the Opening Brief, the Supplemental Brief, and above, the order 
granting summary dismissal of all of Gerry's claims except ineffective assistance of counsel 
should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings on those issues. 
B. The Claims of an Unconstitutional Judgment and Sentence and Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Were Not Waived and Should Not Have Been Summarily Dismissed. 
The Opening Brief sets out the case that even if the state's notice was sufficient and 
summary judgment was appropriate on some issues, the issues of an unconstitutional judgment 
and sentence and prosecutorial misconduct should not have been summarily dismissed because 
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those issues could not have been fully raised in the direct appeal. State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 
410,420, 716 P.2d 1182, 1192 (1985). See also, Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 21 P.3d 
924 (2001 ), and Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 686 (2000). Appellant's Opening Brief at 
pages 19-22. 
The state does not dispute that issues such as an unconstitutional judgment and sentence 
and prosecutorial misconduct which require proof of facts outside the trial record are properly 
raised in post-conviction. Rather, the state argues that Gerry's counsel waived those issues. 
Respondent's Brief at pages 13-16. 
As set out in the state's brief, a waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a 
known right or advantage. Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 26, 936 P.2d 219,224 (Ct. App 
1997). And, waiver will not be inferred; the intent to waive must clearly appear on the record. 
Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253,256,846 P.2d 904,907 (1993). 
Respondent's Brief at page 15. See also, Medical Services Group, Inc. v. Boise Lodge No. 310, 
Benev. and Protective Order of El!(S, 126 Idaho 90, 94, 878 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1994), 
"Wavier will not be inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to 
waive." Id. 
The state maintains that Gerry's counsel waived any claims of unconstitutional 
judgment and sentence and/or prosecutorial misconduct by arguing against the dismissal of 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Counsel's remarks were as follows: 
Let me, I guess, start there at the beginning. If - I guess this is somewhat circular, 
but if the judgment, and therefore, the sentence which followed the judgment, 
were arrived upon or arrived at due to trial or pretrial proceedings wherein 
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ineffective assistance of counsel occurred and/or prosecutorial misconduct in the 
proceedings, that judgment and sentence should be, and I believe the law allows, 
subject to collateral attack, which this action certainly is. 
Tr. 1/9/07 p. 9. 
Following this comment, counsel went on to set out what sorts of investigative efforts he 
was making on ineffective assistance of counsel issues and asked that he be allowed 30 more 
days to supplement the record. Id. 
While counsel's argument was not a1tful and did not focus on the issnes of the 
constitutionality of the judgment and sentence nor prosecutorial misconduct, counsel never said 
that he intended to waive those issues. In fact, counsel specifically mentioned prosecutorial 
misconduct as a basis for collateral attack. In no way were counsel's arguments about ineffective 
assistance of counsel "a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive." Medical 
Services Group, Inc. v. Boise Lodge No. 310, Benev. and Protective Order of Elks, supra. 
The state's argument is contrary to the record. This is shown by the failure of the state 
to cite specific language from counsel's comments wherein counsel makes a clear statement that 
he intends to waive all issues of unconstitutionality or prosecutorial misconduct. Rather, the state 
is asking this Court to infer a waiver: "Instead counsel appeared to concede the state's point with 
regard to the first two issues by attempting to instead preserve the first two claims a claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel." Respondent's Brief at page 9 (emphasis added). However, the 
case law is undisputed: a waiver must be clear and unequivocal. Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. 
Lipsky, supra; Medical Services Group, Inc. v. Boise Lodge No. 310, Benev. and Protective Order 
of Elks, supra. "Appearing" to concede an issue by focusing argument on other aspects of a case 
is not a clear and unequivocal waiver of the issue. 
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The state's argument that the issues of unconstitutionality and prosecutorial misconduct 
were properly summarily dismissed because counsel waived those issues is contrmy to the record 
and should be rejected. As a fallback position, the state has also argued that "Because these 
claims could have been brought on direct appeal but were not, they were waived and cannot be 
considered in post-conviction proceedings." Respondent's Brief at page 15. However, the state 
makes a very brief argument in favor of this position, makes no specific references to the record 
before the district court, and does not explain how the post-conviction claims discussed in Gerry's 
Opening Brief could have been raised in direct appeal. 
As set out in the Opening Brief, Gerry's claims included that the jury relied upon 
information not in evidence to convict, that the jury was improperly selected, and that the jury had 
been contan1inated by a prospective juror's comments. Gerry also claimed Brady' violations, 
intimidation of witnesses by the state, and tampering with the evidence. See Appellant's Opening 
Brief at pages 21-22. Each of these issues requires evidence outside the record on appeal. 
Therefore, none could have been raised in the direct appeal. State v. Windsor, supra; Raudebaugh 
v. State, supra; Sivak v. State, supra. 
There was no waiver of the claims of unconstitutionality in the judgment and sentence 
and/or prosecutorial misconduct. Moreover, those claims could not have been brought in direct 
appeal. Therefore, the district court erred in summarily dismissing them. The order of dismissal 
should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). 
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C. The Error in Denying Gen:y the Right to Testify Requires the Granting of Post-
Conviction Relief. 
As set out in the Opening Brief, if the error in denying Geny the right to testify in his own 
behalf is analyzed as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, post-conviction relief is required 
because counsel's perfonnance was deficient and the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 22-26. In 
addition, if the error is analyzed as directed by DeRushe as a claim of the denial of a constitutional 
right, relief is also required because the state cannot demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error did not contribute to Geny's conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S. Ct. 
1283 (1967); State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516,522, 708 P.2d 921,927 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Appellant's Supplemental Brief at pages 3-5. 
In its brief, the state does not offer any argument at all that the district court properly 
analyzed the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The state makes no attempt to argue either 
that counsel's performance was not deficient or that the deficiency was not prejudicial. 
Respondent's Brief at pages 16-18. The failure to raise any argument to rebut the conclusion that, 
if the issue is analyzed as ineffective assistance of counsel, post-conviction relief is required, does 
not, of course, require this Court to find in Gerry's favor. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 
134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 (2000). However, it is difficult to imagine that counsel for the state 
would have failed to raise any argument, either that there was not deficient performance or that 
the deficiency was not prejudicial, if such any such argument, however tenuous, could have been 
made. 
Likewise, the state does not offer any argument that if the claim is to be analyzed as a 
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deprivation of a constitutional right claim and the Chapman standard applies, that either there was 
no error in depriving Gerry of the right to testify or that if such error occurred it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent's Brief at pages 16-18. Again, this failure to make a 
counter-argument to Gerry's argument does not require this Court to reverse the order denying 
post-conviction relief. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., supra. But, again, it is difficult to 
imagine that if the state could think of any argument at all that Gerry was not deprived of his 
constitutional rights or that the deprivation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it would 
remain silent. 
Based upon the record in this case, Gerry's Opening and Supplemental Briefs and the 
state's failure to offer any argument in rebuttal, Gerry asks that this Court either analyze the issue 
as one of ineffective assistance of counsel and find error in the denial of relief, or analyze the 
issue as one of the deprivation of his constitutional right to testify and on that basis find error in 
the denial of relief. 
The only argument the state does offer is that Gerry is estopped from arguing on appeal 
that his claim based on the denial of the right to testify should be analyzed as a deprivation of a 
constitutional right rather than as ineffective assistance of counsel. The state bases this argument 
upon the doctrine of invited error, stating that because Gerry framed the issue as one of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the district court and in his initial brief, he cannot now argue that the issue 
should be considered as one of denial of a constitutional right. Respondent's Brief at pages 16-18. 
In making this argument, the state does not cite DeRushe. Yet, DeRushe is controlling and 
calls for the analysis offered in the Supplemental Brief. 
In DeRushe, the petitioner filed a prose petition alleging errors by his trial counsel, 
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including that counsel had deprived him of the right to testify in his own behalf. DeRushe v. 
State, 146 ldaho at 601,200 P.3d at 1149. While the Supreme Court opinion does not contain the 
full text of the original petition filed by DeRushe, it does describe the document. The Court 
wrote: 
In his petition and supporting affidavit, DeRushe stated that his attorney in the 
underlying criminal case had denied his request to testify in his own behalf. He set 
forth the testimony he wanted the jury to hear, which laid out facts to support a 
claim of self-defense. 
146 ldaho at 605, 200 P.3d at 1152. 
Based upon that petition, the district court in DeRushe applied an ineffective assistance of 
counsel analysis. And, the Supreme Court found that to be error. 
Id. 
The district court erred in analyzing DeRushe's claim as alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel rather than as alleging denial of his constitutional right to 
testify in his own behalf. 
DeRushe set out his claims in the same way Gerry did. DeRushe told the district court that 
counsel had denied him the right to testify and told the court what his testimony would have been 
had he given it. This is exactly what Gerry did. And, just as the Supreme Court did not look to 
the invited error doctrine in DeRushe to avoid application of the proper analysis, the invited error 
doctrine does not apply here. 
But, of course, this Court need not even reach this question. As evidenced by the state's 
lack of argument to the contrary, whether the error in denying Gerry his right to testify is analyzed 
as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or a claim of the denial of a constitutional right to 
testify, there was error and the error requires reversal of the order denying post-conviction relief. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Because proper notice was not given, the order summarily dismissing all issues other than 
ineffective assistance of counsel should now be reversed and the matter remanded for further 
proceedings on those issues. In the alternative, because the issues of an unconstitutional judgment 
and sentence and prosecutorial misconduct could not have been raised in direct appeal, the order 
summarily dismissing those issues should now be reversed and the matter remanded for further 
proceedings. And, in any event, the order finding ineffective assistance of trial counsel but 
denying relief because no prejudice was established must now be reversed either because the 
deficient perfonnance of counsel was prejudicial or because the issue should have been analyzed 
as the deprivation of the constitutional right to testify which cannot be shown hannless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
~ 
Respectfully submitted this l( day of July, 2009. 
~ 1k,.fetll ~ 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorneys for Gerry Barcella 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /~ of July, 2009, I deposited in the United States mail, 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing, postage prepaid addressed to: 
Office of the Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Dennis Benjamin 
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